Strict battle guidelines hampering British troops in Afghanistan

Soldiers from 4 Platoon searching a compound where a rocket-propelled grenade was found. British troops have run into pockets of resistance after many Taliban leaders fled or were killed in the offensive

BRITISH soldiers have been catapulted into a deadly and often frustrating game of cat-and-mouse with the Taliban, played out in poppy fields and mud compounds, where dirt tracks are still thought to be littered with mines.

As they fight a severely weakened network of insurgents in the largest military operation in Helmand since 2001, they have expressed frustration at the Taliban’s ability to manipulate their rules of engagement.

Caveats imposed to minimise the risk of killing civilians have forced British commanders to adopt new tactics to hunt and kill the small groups of insurgents who have begun to seep back into northern Nad-e-Ali, where last week about 4,000 British troops seized a small pocket of land once occupied by the Taliban.

Strict new guidelines brought in last year by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander of allied forces in Afghanistan, have forced soldiers to rely less and less on airstrikes to kill insurgents, although Nato still dominates the skies above Helmand with drones.

Days into the intense assault of Operation Moshtarak it became clear to commanders that the Taliban’s leaders had either been killed in targeted raids launched ahead of the main air attack or had fled in the face of overwhelming British force.

But, as the week progressed, soldiers from the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) stumbled into isolated pockets of resistance.

A group of Taliban gunmen, numbering no more than five, opened fire on a BRF patrol as it trudged back to base through the boggy fields, sending four poorly aimed rounds cracking above the soldiers’ heads.

As the British soldiers tried to determine where the shots had been fired from, men from 3 Platoon sprinted towards the firing point.

“I’ve a bad feeling about this,” said Lieutenant George Mackay-Lewis as he watched the scene unfold. Bursting into a mud compound believed to house Taliban militants, 3 Platoon threw a flash grenade in first before firing a few rounds into the walls to stun the insurgents and minimise the risk of wounding or killing civilians.

By the time the soldiers reached the western edge of the compound, the fighters had fled. “It would have been the perfect time to fire a warning shot but we can’t do that because it has caused civilian casualties in the past. We could’ve got them to stop as they fled, though,” said Mackay-Lewis, infuriated that the first insurgents seen since the start of the operation had got away.

As the soldiers again trudged back through the marshy fields, the Taliban sent a final salvo their way, launching a rocket-propelled grenade. But dusk was fast approaching. The soldiers noted the firing point and continued back to base.

“Today we got feathers and a little bit of chicken. But it wasn’t enough for a full meal,” the officer commanding the BRF, who cannot be named, told his men as they huddled around him, listening to the day’s debriefing in the darkness of a small mud room. “The honeymoon’s over, guys. They are going to fight.”

The next day, a single gunshot fired at 4 Platoon triggered a similar pursuit. As the BRF sprinted towards the firing point, a Reaper drone circling above spotted insurgents running into a compound.

The fire support team at a nearby makeshift base watched the shaky image from the drone’s cameras on a computer screen.

Two insurgents were seen knocking a “murder hole” through a wall, of the kind used by the Taliban to fire at British soldiers. The insurgents darted between firing positions, peering through fresh murder holes and cracks in the walls.

One appeared to be carrying something wrapped in cloth, possibly a weapon. The airspace above the compound was cleared of helicopters and jets, creating room for the drone to fire a Hellfire missile.

Mackay-Lewis told his men: “Command wants to make sure they are insurgents inside and not civilians.”

The Taliban’s radio spluttered and crackled into life. “We can see the soldiers standing by a wall,” said one of the insurgents. “Be prepared to fire when they approach us.”

The advance paused as the BRF commander decided whether to launch the drone’s missile. He gave the order to engage and then immediately retracted it as he began to doubt that the men were insurgents.

“We decided that there was no imminent threat, so we held back. It’s called courageous restraint and we try to exercise it whenever we can,” said Captain James Boutle.

The commander desperately needed the insurgents to open fire or to reveal themselves in the open, away from the compound, to permit him to call in an airstrike with confidence.

“We can’t move in too soon, in case we spook them and they leg it. We need to surround the compound first,” said Mackay-Lewis. “The plan is to send 3 Platoon forward to draw fire and then we can fire a Hellfire missile or mortars. This way we can be sure they are insurgents.”

But as the minutes ticked by, the insurgents fled. The Reaper drone lost the men momentarily as they passed behind a wall. When they were next spotted, they were standing among a group of civilians, making it impossible for the drone to positively identify them.

Frustration mounted as the soldiers felt any chance of capturing or killing the insurgents slowly slip away.

Crouching in the gap between two mud walls, the platoon’s sharpshooter, Lance-Corporal Steven “Recce” Simmons, was ordered to watch for insurgents fleeing the area.

Simmons spotted a man walking on the far side of the field, but he carried no weapon and was allowed to amble off. Another suspect fled across a field and 3 Platoon chased him. An Afghan soldier attached to the brigade fired two shots before the man stopped and walked back towards the platoon, covered in mud.

He was taken into custody and brought back to the base, where he was blindfolded and fed before being flown by helicopter to Camp Bastion.

“This is where we want [the Taliban] in a year’s time,” said Mackay-Lewis. “Where they are not fighting us or attacking us, where we are controlling the plays. For now, though, it is incredibly frustrating.”

Back at their base, with the benefit of hindsight, most of the soldiers agreed with the decision to refrain from firing the Hellfire. The group of fighters had been routed without a single shot being fired: a success, they said.

But the BRF commander regretted the decision. “I should have given the order,” he admitted later. “We had them.”

British forces are operating under a series of intricate regulations that dictate when soldiers can fire at the Taliban. Where there is a risk of killing civilians or damaging compounds with indirect fire from a drone, the order cannot normally be given by commanders on the ground.

“I think some ground commanders think they are better placed to make the decision. I think some feel the process could be speeded up,” said Boutle, who is responsible for co-ordinating the drones, attack helicopters and mortars used to support the BRF’s soldiers on the ground.

“But they sometimes miss the bigger picture. I can sit in the operations room with my cup of coffee and make clinical decisions without letting the fog of war cloud them. The point of this operation is not to kill insurgents; it is to protect the people.”

• Holland’s coalition government collapsed yesterday after failing to agree whether to extend the deployment of its 1,600 soldiers in Afghanistan.